ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, for the first time in two decades, copyrighted works of art, music, film, and literature are scheduled to enter the public domain. This promises to be a huge boon to both the public, who will be able freely to access these works, and to creative artists who wish to perform, adapt, copy, or otherwise make use of them.
Of course, to the owners of some of these copyrighted works, their transition into the public domain means the loss of millions of dollars of revenue. Book publishers, movie studios, and, perhaps most importantly, the Walt Disney Corporation will face a world where their creations are available for unauthorized copying and adaptation by anyone who wishes to make use of them. 1 Accordingly, it seems inevitable that, just as they did in the 1990s, the copyright industries will engage in another round of congressional lobbying to extend the term of protection for an additional period.
The standard justification for intellectual property (IP) protection is that the exclusive rights of copyright law provide incentives for their creators to invest in creating new works.
2 Without IP protection, creations could be freely copied, and, in theory, creators would not be able to recoup the costs of investing in the new work. The primary argument in favor of extending the copyright term for yetto-be-created works is based on this incentive-to-create rationale: a longer term 1 Trademark law will provide Disney some relief against unauthorized uses, such as a Mickey Mouse doll, that are likely to confuse consumers as to the source of goods or services. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(a).
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means that the author will be able to generate more money from her work thereby increasing the ex ante incentive to create the work in the first place.
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The incentive-to-create rationale fails entirely, however, in the case of extending the copyright term for already existing books, music, and movies. The extension of protection for The Sun Also Rises does not increase the incentives for Hemingway to produce more or better work. 4 He is, after all, dead. 5 Accordingly,
proponents of term extension have had to offer other reasons why longer copyrights will increase social welfare. During the adoption of the last copyright term extension legislation and the litigation surrounding it, the copyright industries and some leading scholars have put forward three justifications for increasing the term of protection for already existing works.
First, they have argued that, without additional protection, the publishing industries will not have sufficient incentives to preserve, protect, and commercialize old works. They claim that without the protections that copyright provides, works that fall into the public domain will be under-utilized. This is a version of the classic "public goods" problem in economics. Second, and in some ways the inverse of the first argument, proponents of term extension claim that works will be overused by a public with free access to them, thereby undermining the works' cultural and economic value. This is a version of the "tragedy of the commons": once anybody can use "Rhapsody in Blue" in a movie or a commercial, the song will be overused and lose its appeal. The proponents' third argument claims that uncontrolled uses of culturally valuable works will tarnish 3 Id. 4 It has been argued that a potential author today seeing an extension of Hemingway's copyright will perceived a signal that Congress will give the potential author's works similarly gracious treatment in the future, thereby stimulating the potential author to produce more now. With the present copyright term already at life-of-the-author plus 70 years, the "added incentive" argument has not been taken very seriously. or debase those works, because the public's experiences with poor quality or "inappropriate" versions of the works will affect their judgments about the works' quality and meaning and therefore their underlying value. Audiences who see a substandard production of Eugene O'Neill's The Iceman Cometh performed by the Evans Elementary School Drama Club may not wish to read the play or see another performance of it afterward and thereby never fully grasp the play's treatment of anarchy and socialism. As with the incentive-to-create rationale for new works, these three justifications for extending the term of protection for already existing works have a theoretical appeal. The important question, however, is whether they stand up to empirical scrutiny. We attempt to answer that question in this Article.
In recent years, legal scholars have turned increasingly to empirical and experimental methods to test longstanding assumptions about how laws operate.
These methods have been particularly successful when applied to IP, because, unlike some areas of the law, IP law's assumptions about markets, incentives, and human behavior are explicit. 6 This Article continues our previous research applying empirical and experimental methods to IP issues. It reports data from two studies that test the validity of proponents' arguments for extending the copyright term. In short, we find almost no evidence to support the claims made in favor of copyright term extension.
In Part I, we describe the debate over copyright term extension and the rationales in favor of it. We show how these rationales affected the last term extension act and the litigation following it, and we discuss how they will likely come up again in renewed calls for extension. Part II reports on our empirical tests of the extension rationales. These tests rely on an interesting and understudied creative industry: the market for audiobook recordings of novels.
Audiobooks are "derivative works" within the definition of copyright law, 7 and they present a number of opportunities for studying claims about the exploitation and commercialization of works. Our data compare the markets for audiobook recordings of popular novels on either side of the public domain divide: the decade of public domain works from 1913-1922 and the decade of copyrighted works from [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] . In Part III we apply our findings to the debate about copyright term extension. Although our research is in no way conclusive on the issue, it strongly suggests that all three arguments in favor of copyright term extension are mistaken.
I. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE
The primary salience of the data we analyze in Part II relates to the ongoing and vociferous debate over the retroactive extension of copyright protection to existing creative works. The arguments in favor of extension were 7 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work'." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
first raised fifteen years ago when powerful players in the copyright industries (primarily film, music, and book publishing) engaged in extensive lobbying to encourage Congress to pass legislation to prevent their works from falling into the public domain. Following the success of those efforts in the U.S., the copyright industries have pushed for term extensions internationally. We briefly chart the history of the lobbying efforts in both the U.S. and abroad. We then present the three primary economic justifications offered in favor of copyright term extension, all of which assert that bad things happen when works fall into the public domain. The data we present in Part II tend to refute the attempts made by prominent economists and the copyright industries to justify extending the term of protection to existing works.
A. The United States: Sonny Bono, CTEA, and Looking Ahead to 2018
The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power to "promote the Domain, 13 GREENBAG 343, 346 (2010) ("Currently a debate exists globally about the scope of protections for IP . . . Proponents of the current strong rules protecting intellectual property argue that a failure to reward innovation curtails investment."); Kretschmer, supra note 20. Jack Valenti, the President of the Motion Picture Association of America once testified derisively to Congress that public domain works were "orphans," 43 meaning that without parents (owners) they would be subject to distressing abuse.
Sophisticated commentators in support of copyright term extension have offered more detailed and theory-driven arguments in support of their position. These arguments, which we discuss here, fall into three categories. All three primary arguments rely on factual assertions about what happens when works fall into the public domain. Our study of the market for audio books, discussed in Part II below, tests all three assertions.
The Under-Exploitation Hypothesis
The most prominent justification for term extension asserts that works become less available to consumers when they fall in to the public domain. In their influential article arguing for indefinitely renewable copyright for valuable works, the law and economics scholars William Landes and Richard Posner reasoned that "[A]n absence of protection for intangible works may lead to inefficiencies because of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting those works."
44 Landes and Posner's argument is a version of the classic "public goods" problem in economics. Intellectual property is expensive to create, but once it has been created, it can be cheaply copied and used by others.
Because creators of IP cannot easily exclude others from using it, theory implies that they will not be able to recoup their investment costs and will never engage in creating the work in the first place. Thus, the law has to step in to create legal boundaries allowing creators the chance to recover their investments.
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This argument can be applied not just to new works but to already created works as well. Some works require costly investments to maintain, produce, and distribute them over the years. For example, when audio formats changed, someone had to spend money to transfer recordings on old vinyl disks to a digital format or the old music would not be accessible to most listeners. In theory, because those who would invest resources in the conversion cannot prevent others from free riding on their efforts, they will not be able to recoup their investment and, thus, never bother to make it in the first place. Without a method for recouping the cost of conversion, preservation or reproduction, the underexploitation hypothesis maintains, commercializers will have inadequate incentives to continue production and distribution of older works. Recall that this was the primary worry that Congress expressed when passing CTEA in 1998.
Professor Arthur Miller adds a related concern about the underexploitation of copyrighted works. He worries that new works deriving from and based on materials in the public domain will be underproduced. Copyright law gives owners the exclusive right to make or license derivative works like adaptations, sequels, and translations that are based on the original work. 46 Miller argues that these derivative works will not be made without longer copyright the derivatives, the motion picture, the TV series, the documentary, whatever it may be-perhaps even a musical! . . . We must incentivize the dissemination industries, the preservation industries, and the derivative work industries."
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According to Miller's argument, without the ability to prevent copiers, no one will be willing to invest the resources in creating a musical version of A Passage to India, because, if it proved successful, others would be able to prepare their own musicals of the book. These competing versions would drive down the value of the first musical thereby undermining the incentives to create it in the first place.
A staunch advocate of term extension, Miller believes that works need owners in order to be adequately exploited in derivative forms.
The Overuse Hypothesis
The "tragedy of the commons," whereby common ownership leads to the degradation of a shared resource, forms the basis of the second primary theoretical justification for preventing works from falling into the public domain. 48 The tragedy of the commons can occur when a group of people collectively own some resource, like a pasture. Each person has the incentive to maximize his use of the pasture before others can do so. This leads to overuse and depletion of the pasture through overgrazing. Similarly, if no one has the exclusive right to a creative work, then it might be overused (imagine dozens of advertisers all using the same song). 49 In such situations, the typical economic In other words, without owners to police the frequency with which a work is used, it may be worn out and lose its value.
The overuse hypothesis rests on the assumption that the value of creative works, like the value of a pasture, is finite and exhaustible. 53 Each work has an optimal level at which it should be exploited and each use beyond that number decreases the work's value to others. While an individual owner of the copyright has the incentive to maintain the value of a work over time by preventing it from being overused, once the work falls into the public domain others will rush to who stuffed it with commercials.' There was no quality control over home video copies of the film--consumers had no way of knowing whether the tape they were purchasing was a poor quality bootleg version (which most were)." & TECH. 435, 451 (2005) . 53 The overuse hypothesis also assumes that people will exploit the resource in such a way that its value will be diminished. Considerable social science evidence, including from the field of behavioral game theory, demonstrate that this kind of overexploitation does not always take place.
See, e.g. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
exploit the work's value immediately. 54 According to this theory a creative work such as a song has increasing social and economic value up to a certain number of uses in a given time period (e.g., in commercials during a year). Once that usage level is met, however, its value diminishes. Individual copyright owners are incentivized to exploit their works at the socially optimal maximum, but if works fall into the public domain, others will overuse the works and diminish their value.
The Misuse Hypothesis
The third rationale for extending copyright protection to already existing works is based on the fear that creative works will lose their value not through overuse but through misuse. A number of commentators have expressed concern that inappropriate uses of works will debase them and reduce their value. Finally, at the request of the Library of Congress, Tim Brooks studied the rate at which copyright owners were making old vinyl audio recordings of popular music available to the public. He found that non-owners had converted more music from vinyl to digital format than copyright owners had.
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B. Study 1: The Exploitation of Popular Fiction in Audiobooks
While the research discussed above has cast doubt on the hypotheses offered by some economists and proponents of term extension, the present audiobook studies enable us to more directly ascertain what happens to works when they fall into the public domain. Studying the audiobook market offers a number of distinct advantages. Audiobooks count as derivative works under U.S.
copyright law, because they are transformations of other copyrighted works. 70 All of the arguments about term extension are based significantly on the presumed ill effects of the public domain on the production of derivative works, so, unlike the earlier research discussed above, this study can help explore the public domain's effect on different versions of the same work.
Moreover, the market for audiobooks is distinctive in its heterogeneity.
Many audiobooks, of both public domain and copyrighted works, are produced at significant expense by firms that use professional actors working on sound stages. Study 2 we take advantage of this heterogeneity in audiobook quality to test the hypothesis that misuse affects the value of the underlying work.
Methods: Study 1
The underuse hypothesis and the overuse hypothesis make empirically testable assertions about the availability of works once they enter the public domain. These hypotheses assert that the work will be either under-exploited or diluted, respectively, after it loses copyright protection. Many works that are subject to copyright, however, have no significant remaining value when they fall into the public domain.. Accordingly, the hypotheses are only relevant to those ("Our feeling is this: in order for LibriVox to be successful we must welcome anyone who wishes to honour a work of literature by lending their voice to it. Some readers are better than others, and the quality of reading will change from book to book and sometimes from chapter to chapter. But we will not judge your reading, though we may give you some advice if you ask for it. This is not Hollywood, and LibriVox has nothing to do with commercial media's values, production or otherwise. However: we think almost all of our readings are excellent, and we DO try to catch technical problems (like repeated text etc.) with our Listeners Wanted/prooflistening stage.").
works that have retained significant value at the time when they would enter the public domain. Our study focuses on just these works.
Following the methodology used in one of the studies discussed above, 74 we have derived a list of bestselling novels that were published in the decade before 80 The availability of free recordings of public domain novels from Librivox was also collected. Finally, in addition to noting the availability of titles, we computed the average prices of professional recordings across the different retailers.
Results: Study 1
When we compare the full samples of 171 public domain novels and 174 copyrighted novels, we see some similarities and some differences. Of the public domain novels, 58 of the 171 titles (33%) have at least one available recording. Of Our data suggest that for bestselling novels from 1913-1932, being in the public domain roughly doubles the likelihood that the work will be available in audiobook format. Despite this increase, however, the fact that a work is in the public domain and is thus free to be used without licensing does not ensure that it will be made into an audiobook. Even when we include the versions available on Librivox, fewer than half of the public domain titles are available in audiobooks.
Moreover, the similarity in prices between professionally read public domain and copyrighted audiobooks at least implies the public domain titles are not being produced in appreciably lower quality versions.
When we turn to the list of titles of enduring popularity, the story is As with the full sample, being in the public domain increases the likelihood that a work of enduring popularity will be available in audiobook format, and it increases the number of recordings of the title that are likely to be available when compared to similar copyrighted works. For these works, we do see full exploitation of public domain novels in audiobook format. We leave to Part III our analysis of whether the number of recordings per title constitutes overexploitation.
C. Study 2: Audiobook Quality and Tarnishment
In Study 2 we address the tarnishment hypothesis put forward by economists and proponents of copyright term extension. According to this hypothesis, once works enter the public domain and are free to be used by anyone, they will be subjected to a variety of inappropriate and poor quality uses that will undermine the works' cultural and economic value. Without copyright ownership, so the argument goes, valuable works will not be properly husbanded. This study focuses only on the durable works described in Study 1. Using a novel experimental methodology, we are able to test 1) whether public domain works are produced in poorer quality audiobook versions than copyrighted works and 2)
whether poorer quality audiobook versions affect the perceived value of the novels from which they are made.
Methods: Study 2
To test these questions we relied on the heterogeneity of available audiobook recordings from multiple sources. As we mentioned above, audiobooks are available from both professional and amateur sources. If the tarnishment hypothesis is correct, we would expect that: 1) the quality of audiobook recordings of copyrighted works would be higher than that of audiobooks based on public domain works (because the copyrighted works have an owner to husband them); and 2) the lower quality of the public domain audiobooks would be reflected in a lower perceived value of the underlying novel.
To test these assumptions, we recruited subjects through Amazon Mechanical Turk to listen to selections of audiobook recordings and to provide feedback on them. After agreeing to participate, the subjects were directed to the survey instrument that was hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform. 81 The subjects were told that the survey was being conducted by researchers who were testing the quality of different people as potential audiobook readers. The subjects were then presented with five alternating five-minute recordings taken from the beginning of the fifth chapter of the selected novels. 82 After listening to each selection, the subjects were asked a series of questions:
1) First, they were asked two comprehension questions to ensure that they were paying attention.
2) Next, they were asked to rate the quality of the reader's readiness for commercial distribution on a scale of one to six. 83 81 www.qualtrics.com 82 We selected the fifth chapter to avoid biases associated with particularly well-known or interesting first chapters. 83 The points on the scale were labeled: 1) This reader could never produce a commercially acceptable audiobook.
2) With great improvement this reader could produce an acceptable audiobook.
3) This reader is close to good enough, but still needs some improvement. 4) The reader was acceptable for commercial distribution.
5) The reader was very good, clearly ready for commercial distribution. 6) The reader was excellent.
3) Subjects were then asked if they had read or seen other versions of the work and, if so, how much they liked them.
4) Finally, subjects were told that the surveyors would have multiple paperback copies of the book left over after completing the survey.
The subjects were asked to indicate how much they thought the surveyors should sell the extra copies for, and they were instructed that paperback copies typically sell for $8 to $12.
After listening to the five different recordings, the subjects were asked a series of questions about their own audiobook usage and some demographic questions.
The recordings were chosen from works on our list of the most enduringly popular novels on either side of the copyright-public domain divide, and they came from several different sources. Since there were only sixteen professional recordings of the twenty most durable copyrighted works, we selected all sixteen of them. In addition, we randomly selected sixteen of the twenty professionally recorded public domain audiobooks. Comparing the subjects' responses to these sets of recordings enabled us to test whether the professional versions of the public domain works were being produced at the same standards as professional versions of the copyrighted works.
In addition, we were interested in studying versions of the works that were produced by non-professionals. Accordingly, we selected recordings of the same sixteen public domain works that are downloadable on the website Librivox.
These recordings had been made by private parties using their own equipment. Of course, because the copyrighted works are still under copyright, non-professional recordings of these works are not available publicly. To complete the sample and to provide a control for the comparative attractiveness of the content of all the underlying works, we employed a non-professional reader to record copies of the sixteen copyrighted works. We wanted to make sure that any particularly exciting or interesting prose did not bias the evaluation of the reader.
This strategy gave us a 2 x 2 matrix of recordings (Legal Status:
Copyrighted vs. Public Domain; Source: Professional vs. Non-Professional).
Results: Study 2
Our data provide almost no support for the arguments made by proponents of copyright term extension that once works fall into the public domain they will be produced in poor quality versions that will undermine their cultural or economic value. 84 Our data indicate no statistically significant difference, for example, between the listeners' judgments of the quality of professional audiobook readers of copyrighted and public domain texts. 85 We also fail to find a significant difference between the price that subjects indicate the paperback copies should be sold for. 86 This suggests, as we will discuss in more detail below, that the producers of professional audiobook recordings of public domain works are not using poorer quality readers than are the producers of copyrighted works.
Our data do reveal, however, that the amateur recordings of both copyrighted and public domain works are perceived to be of lower quality than are the professional versions. See Table 3 . Librivox recordings of public domain works were perceived to be significantly worse than professional recordings (3.54 vs. 4.30, on a scale of 1-6, respectively), 87 and the recordings that our assistant 84 The full statistical analysis of our data will be provided in an appendix. In addition to the data reported here, we reran the study with a sample of subjects recruited from the general population by Qualtrics. The results of that study are identical to those reported here, and we chose to report the mTurk data because the quality of the responses that we received were higher in the mTurk sample. 85 Two sample t test, p = 0.4452. To indicate a statistically significant difference, the "p value" should be less than 0.05. 86 Two sample t test, p = 0.9203. 87 Two sample t test, p = 0.0002.
made were perceived to be significantly worse than professional recordings of both copyrighted and public domain works. 88 This difference is not surprisingthe resources that go into professional recordings will tend to be much greater than those that go into amateur recordings.
The important question, however, is whether the perceived difference in quality between amateur and professional recordings resulted in different judgments of the value of the underlying work. Basically, the answer is no, but the data are not entirely unambiguous. In general, we found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the perceived quality of a recording and the amount that subjects thought copies should be sold for. This is important for two reasons. First, it suggests that our metric for studying the underlying value of a work (i.e., asking how much we should sell copies for) is sensitive to changes in quality of the recording and, thus, indicates validity. Second, it suggests that people who listen to poor quality recordings of audiobooks are likely to attribute some of their dissatisfaction to the underlying work. Thus, there appears to be some feedback effect between the quality of a given version of a work and the value of the underlying work. Asst.
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Importantly, though, the correlation between recording quality and price did not manifest itself in the manner predicted by proponents of copyright term extension. Our data indicated no statistically significant differences in book price between any of the paired conditions. 89 Thus, for example, although the Librivox recordings of public domain works were judged to be of lower quality than professional recordings of public domain works, we detected no significant difference between the price subjects indicated for the paperback books.
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Moreover, although we detected a positive correlation between quality and price for the entire sample of works, we found no such correlation within any of the subsamples. These results suggest that although there may be a modest feedback effect associated with poor quality versions of creative works, that effect is not related to whether a work is protected by copyright or not.
D. Limitations of Our Data
Before discussing the implications of our findings for the copyright term extension debate, we wish to pause to reflect on the limits of our data. In the analysis that follows, we do not and cannot claim to have established all the precise effects of works falling into the public domain. There may be effects that we did not measure or that apply to industries other than those we have explored.
Perhaps the biggest limitation of our data involves the difficulty of scientifically proving the lack of a difference. Social scientific research and 89 In addition, we found no meaningful effects based on prior exposure to the works, although this likely was the result of the small sample of subjects who had prior experience with the works. 90 Two sample t test, p = 0.3203. statistical methods are normally aimed at demonstrating the existence of a difference between a treatment group and a control group. When such a difference is shown, there is reason to believe that it is the result of true differences between the groups. When no difference is detected, however, the inverse inference is not necessarily true. The failure to find an effect may be the result of a poor experimental design that is not sensitive to differences that actually exist or of insufficient statistical power.
While it is possible that some such problem accounts for our failure to detect a difference between the quality of copyrighted or public domain professional readings, we are reasonably confident that our findings track reality.
First, our study included hundreds of subjects sourced via multiple methods, and it should have provided the statistical power necessary to detect a difference.
Recall, that we did detect a significant difference between the quality of Librivox recordings and the quality of professional recordings and a positive correlation between the quality of a recording and the valuation of the underlying work, although that correlation did not map on to differences between the source of the reading (professional vs. Librivox).
We certainly hope that future research will continue to study the effects of the public domain on the value of works. Perhaps other methods can be devised that overcome some of these limitations. In the meantime, however, our data suggest that anxieties about the public domain are substantially overblown.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR IP LAW AND POLICY: THE NEXT TIME DISNEY COMES KNOCKING
Our audiobook study has obvious implications for the ongoing worldwide debate over the extension of copyright terms in existing works. That debate has centered on factual assumptions about what happens to works when they fall into the public domain, assumptions that are contradicted by our data. In addition, our data on the pricing of audio books, in conjunction with similar data on book pricing, 91 illustrate one important reason why the copyright term extension debate should matter to consumers: We found higher prices for recordings of the most popular older works.
A. Addressing the Under-Exploitation Hypothesis
Lack of availability has been the most prominent concern expressed by Congress and commentators about works falling into the public domain. If works tended to disappear when their copyright terms expired, a plausible argument could be made for term extension because these lost works would be unavailable for future readers, users, and creators. Consistent with several previous studies, 92 however, we found that audio books were significantly more likely to be made from older bestselling public domain works than from bestselling copyrighted works from the same era. Even excluding audiobooks available for free at www.librivox.org, the public domain works were more available to consumers in audio book form. For the full sample, public domain works were twice as likely to be available, and for the sample of enduringly popular works, public domain titles were 20% more likely to be available. If the argument for copyright term extension turns on the need for incentives to reproduce older works or create derivative works from them, then existing empirical evidence suggests that term extensions are not needed and are probably counter-productive.
B. Addressing the Over-Exploitation Hypothesis
As discussed in Part I, economists not only worry about the underuse of public domain works, they also are concerned that some works will be overexploited if no single owner has the right to exclude others. This tragedy of the commons argument suggests that because no individual has the right to exclude others, everyone has the incentive to rush to exploit the resource while it has value. According to the argument, the public will allegedly encounter public domain works so frequently that their value will be lost. 95 Our data suggest that this alternative ground for copyright term extension is also contradicted by the empirical evidence.
For our whole data set, we found an average of 3.3 recordings made for each recorded public domain work and 3.0 recordings for each recorded copyrighted book, an insignificant difference that provides little evidence that public domain books are being over-exploited and worn out due to their unprotected legal status. In addition, the average price of recorded books in the full public domain data set and the full copyrighted data set was virtually the same, suggesting that the value of the public domain works in comparison to their copyrighted counterparts had not been destroyed by overuse.
We find no evidence of over-exploitation even when we consider only the most enduringly popular public domain and copyrighted works. We observed a significant difference in exploitation rates, although the sample size was small.
Of the twenty works in each group of this sample, the 20 most enduringly popular public domain books had an average 6.25 audio book recordings per title, while the 16 most popular copyrighted works had only 3.25 audio book recordings per title. While this is evidence of a higher level of exploitation, we would argue that it is not evidence of harmful overuse.
One clue that the increased availability of public domain works is not a signal of over-exploitation comes from the pricing data that we accumulated.
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Although audio books made from the durable public domain works do not command as high a price, the price is still fairly high and close to that for copyrighted works. Even with the competition that professional public domain versions face from free recordings on Librivox, they are still able to command 95 For a succinct expression of this concern in the publicity rights context, see Bitton, supra note 45 ("if everyone uses the likeness of Humphrey Bogart in advertising, it will eventually become worthless"). 96 See Table 3 supra.
market prices that are reasonably close to those obtained by copyrighted works.
While professionally produced public domain audiobooks are priced lower than copyrighted versions, there is little reason to believe that this price difference is due to over-exploitation and the "wearing out" phenomenon. Several compelling explanations for the price difference that are unrelated to an overuse effect also exist. First, the producers of the audio recordings from copyrighted books have to pay a royalty to the copyright owner which may increase the cost of producing the work and raise its price in relation to the public domain works which require no such payment. Just as likely, the "intrabrand" competition between the multiple editions of the audio books based on the same public domain work will drive down their prices even in the absence of any "wearing out" phenomenon. Note, however, that despite this competition and the competition from free Librivox recordings, the price for professionally produced public domain audiobooks is still fairly high. Finally, data presented in a prior study suggests a significant disparity in the popularity and appeal of the public domain and copyrighted titles at issue. 97 If the copyrighted works are indeed more iconic, then we would expect versions of them to be sold at a higher price.
Overall, the pricing disparity between audiobooks based on public domain and 97 See Heald, supra note 6, at 1046-7 ("[A]s of 1965, when all of the forty durable books were still protected by copyright, only five of the twenty books (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) that have since fallen into the public domain had sold 1,000,000 copies. As of the same date, eleven of the twenty books (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) still protected by copyright today had sold 1,000,000 copies, despite having on the average ten fewer years to accomplish that feat. Even more tellingly, the top five books from the public domain set (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) had sold a total of only 7,381,709 volumes as of 1965, while the top five sellers from the copyrighted set (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) , 1895-1965, at 111-45 (1967) , and ALICE PAYNE HACKETT & JAMES HENRY BURKE, 80 YEARS OF BEST SELLERS, 1895 -1975 (1977 .
copyrighted works does not convince us that the public has seen its most valuable public domain works dangerously over-recorded.
In addition, as a practical matter, it is difficult to see how the availability of multiple versions of an audiobook would diminish the value of the underlying work. No one is forced to consume an audio book, so multiple copies are not flung in the face of the consuming public who then become tired of hearing the story. If audiobooks were played in the background of commercials or department stores, perhaps repetitive choice-less consumption might negatively affect consumer attitudes, but audiobooks are not used that way. And even with music, which does appear in commercials and in the background ambience of shopping areas, we suspect that businesses try not to alienate their customers by overusing the same music. Market discipline should make over-exploitation highly unlikely-it's just bad business. We find it difficult to imagine how any harm flows from the higher exploitation rate that we measure in the set of the twenty most enduringly popular public domain works.
C. Addressing the Tarnishment Hypothesis
Although many legal analysts are skeptical of the claim that "inappropriate" uses of a work can negatively affect its value, 98 the present study is the first to evaluate empirically the claim that a work will be tarnished by unconstrained uses in the absence of a copyright owner to "husband" the work and protect it from the ravages of the free market. By the same token, one could imagine that a listener to an inferior recording of an audiobook might become less likely to consume the underlying written work, thereby diminishing its value.
Given how easily the claim of misuse can be asserted in attacks on the public domain made by supporters of copyright term extension, we felt that it was critical to take the debasement argument seriously. The audiobook context provided an attractive opportunity for study, because the claim of tarnishment caused by a poor audiobook reading seems more credible than the claim that Santa Claus has been debased by the 33 pornographic movies with Santa appearing in the title.
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In Part I, we explained that any claim of debasement in the audiobook market would be predicated on two underlying factual assumptions. First, readers of public domain audiobooks would have to be inferior to readers of copyrighted audiobooks, and second, the inferior versions of the audiobooks would have to negatively affect consumers' valuation of the underlying work. We found little support for either assumption.
Regarding the first prong of the hypothesis, professional readers of audiobooks made from public domain works were rated just as highly as professional readers of copyrighted books. The companies that produce public domain audiobooks appear to be selecting readers who are as talented as those selected for copyrighted titles. According to the results of our study, when consumers go to the three main sources for audiobooks (www.audible.com, Amazon, and Barnes & Nobles), they will likely find that the public domain books are equally well read as the copyrighted books. These data substantially undermine any claim of debasement in the most important market for audiobooks.
Market discipline is apparently sufficient to insure that the producer of an audiobook for commercial sale will hire a competent reader. Producers of audiobooks would like to establish a positive reputation and make a steady profit in the market. 102 It should be no surprise that such producers take adequate care in the selection of readers whether the underlying work chosen for exploitation is copyrighted or in the public domain.
We did find, however, that the amateur readers who distributed audio versions of public domain books on www.librivox.org were, not surprisingly, rated significantly lower than professional readers of the same books. Nonprofessionals using their own equipment produce significantly lower quality recordings that do professional readers in recording studios.
The question for the second prong of the tarnishment hypothesis, then, is whether these lower quality recordings resulted in lower valuations of the underlying works. Although we did find a positive correlation between the quality of readings and the subjects' valuation of the underlying work, that effect did not correlate with the source of the recording. In other words, quality correlates with valuation whether the subject listened to an amateur recording, a professional recording of a public domain book or a professional recording of a copyrighted book. However, the absolute values assigned to the underlying works by subjects who listened to audiobooks from all three sources were not significantly different.
So, the tarnishment thesis has some force, but ownership does not prevent tarnishment in this particular market. proponents of term extension argue: that ownership prevents tarnishment in a way that free market discipline does not.
We do not and cannot claim that our data conclusively prove that falling into the public domain has no effect on the value of a work. Effects may exist that we were unable to measure, or they may exist for industries or products that we have not studied. But even if works are theoretically harmed by falling into the public domain, proponents of term extension should be expected to establish such losses empirically, because term extension comes with considerable costs that must be justified. One such cost, already noted, involves pricing. The exclusive rights granted by copyright can sometimes allow owners to charge above-market rates for their products. Imposing such costs on consumers is only worthwhile if the public is getting something valuable in return. If proponents feel that imposing these costs are justified, then they should support their arguments with more than bald assertions.
Perhaps more important than the cost to consumers, other creators must bear higher costs when already created works continue to remain subject to copyright protection. Creators may wish to perform these works, or adapt them for new uses, or incorporate them into other kinds of works. 103 When works are protected by copyright, however, creators must obtain a license or face stiff legal penalties. This creates multiple problems for new creators and, thus, the public.
Copyright owners may demand more in licensing fees than creators are willing or able to pay, resulting in works not getting made. 104 In other cases, the copyright owners may be impossible to locate and contact. For these "orphan works," the opportunity for bargaining over their use is impossible, and again, derivative works go uncreated. 105 If the public is going to be asked to bear costs for an additional period of years, it is incumbent upon term extension proponents to establish that those costs are worth bearing.
D. Tarnishment beyond Term Extension
In addition, we note, that our audiobook quality and valuation data may be relevant in multiple contexts outside the copyright term extension debate. First, some copyright fair use disputes seem to turn on the argument that inappropriate uses will devalue a copyrighted work. For example, those who oppose the publication of fan fiction (for example, new Harry Potter tales concocted by enthusiastic fans on the internet 106 ) often allege that the copyrighted characters will be tarnished by unconstrained storytelling on the web. 107 Our data may suggest that amateur fan fiction is unlikely to negatively affect the value of the underlying character franchise.
Second, outside of the realm of copyright law, our study might provide support for those who applaud the judiciary's continuing reluctance to vigorously implement the Federal Trademark Anti-Dilution Act. 108 The tarnishment prong of dilution doctrine asserts that a trademark loses some of its intrinsic value when consumers encounter the mark used in an inappropriate context, such as when the mark is placed on goods of inferior quality. Our data show that listeners to Librivox recordings find the readers to be inferior but do not translate that sentiment to a significantly lower valuation of the associated work. Finally, the doctrine of post-sale confusion in trademark law rests on the assumption that a trademark owner is harmed when a bystander merely observes a trademark on an inferior product (imagine someone who sees a poor quality Chicago Bears sweat shirt without knowing that it's a knock off). Our data may suggest that the assumption of such a harm is unrealistic.
CONCLUSION
The copyright term extension debate, as it once again begins to heat up, will have substantial consequences for the creative industries and the consuming public. If copyrighted works begin once again to enter the public domain, their owners will stand to lose millions of dollars in revenue. On the other hand, that revenue comes directly from consumers' pockets and the expiration of valuable copyrights saves those consumer costs. Perhaps more importantly, those works will be available to an army of creative artists who will be able to use them in their works in ways that were impossible while the works were copyrighted.
Whether it will be a good thing if and when this happens is an empirical question that is susceptible to quantitative measurement. This Article has addressed that question.
Our data suggest that the three principal arguments in favor of copyright term extension-under-exploitation, over-exploitation, and tarnishment-are unsupported There seems little reason to fear that once works fall into the public domain, their value will be substantially reduced based on the amount or manner in which they are used. We do not claim that there are no costs to movement into the public domain, but, on the opposite side of the ledger, there are considerable benefits to users of open access to public domain works. We suspect that these benefits dramatically outweigh the costs.
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